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JURISDICTION
Original appellate jurisdiction over the Judgment entered by
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, Utah
is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989 Supp.)*

The Supreme Court has elected,

pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-2-2(4)

(1989 Supp.), to

transfer this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

Therefore,

jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1989 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
As a preface to its responses to the three issues raised on
appeal by Defendant St. Joseph High School Board of Financial
Trustees

("Defendant"), Plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin and Robbins

Construction

Company

("Plaintiff") has raised

two additional

issues which are dispositive of the appeal without reaching its
merits:
1.

Whether the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over

the appeal because of Defendant's failure to file a Notice of
Appeal within the time provided by law; and
2.

Whether

the

appeal

is

barred

by

Defendant's

voluntary payment of the Judgment amount and the execution of
a Satisfaction of Judgment which does not preserve any part
of the appeal.
Defendant's issues presented on appeal are not restated here
but are responded to in Points 3, 4 and 5 respectively.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The present case is a contract

action by Plaintiff against Defendant on a written "cost plus"
contract for the remodeling of St. Joseph's Gymnasium and the
addition of a library. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant had failed
to

pay

approximately

$30,000.00

of

construction

costs

and

contractor fees.
Defendant counterclaimed against Plaintiff for construction
delay damages and for damages relating to the fact that actual
construction costs exceeded the architect's estimate.
B.

Course of Proceeding.

The case was tried to a jury in

the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, Utah, the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding, from December 3 to December
8, 1987.

Plaintiff specifically objects to the characterization

of the proceedings below as contained in Defendant's Brief (pages
3-4).

However, facts relating to the course of proceedings have

been included only to the extent that they are relevant to the
issues on appeal.

Such facts are incorporated in the individual

sections of Plaintiff's Brief as applicable.
C.

Disposition of the Court Below. On December 8, 1987 the

jury returned a Special Verdict awarding Plaintiff a Judgment of
$19,584.01. The jury also by Special Verdict found that Plaintiff
owed Defendant nothing on its counterclaims.

(Record pages 637-

639.)
After the interest issue was briefed by counsel and argued to
the Court, Judge Wahlquist granted interest of $6,350.18 and $6.40
2

per day thereafter until the Judgment was entered on February 1,
1988.

(Record pages 821-825.)
Based on Plaintiff's Verified Memorandum of Costs and a

hearing held thereon on March 23, 1988, Judge Wahlquist awarded
costs in the amount of $232.75. (Record pages 895, 896.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff declines to give an independent statement of facts.
All

facts

necessary

to

the

disposition

of

the

appeal

are

appropriately located in the Court's Findings of Fact (Record pages
821-825.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant's failure to file a timely Notice of Appeal presents
an absolute jurisdictional bar to its appeal.
POINT II
By voluntarily paying the full amount of the Judgment, and
executing a Satisfaction of Judgment, Defendant has acquiesced in
and received the benefit of the Judgment and therefore is barred
from appealing any portion of the same.
POINT III
The failure of the Lower Court to give Defendant's requested
jury instructions relating to its counterclaim is not a valid basis
for reversing the Lower Court's Judgment, because Defendant failed
to object to the Lower Court's refusal to give instructions, the
instructions were given in essence and the requested instructions
even if given could not have benefited Defendant.
3

POINT IV
The Lower Court's characterization of the architect as the
agent of Defendant in the jury instructions was accurate. Even if
it was inaccurate, it did not prejudice Defendant.
POINT V
The Lower Court's instruction regarding burden of proof is
not a valid basis for appeal because Defendant failed to raise the
issue at trial and the instruction as given correctly characterizes
the law.
POINT VI
In light of the clear and obvious defects on appeal, Plaintiff
is entitled to an award of damages and attorney's fees incurred in
defending against this frivolous appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT APPEAL
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY FILE ITS NOTICE OF
APPEAL.
Defendant's Statement of the Case (Defendant's Brief, pp. 24) omits several significant post-Judgment aspects of the present
case.

Most obviously absent is a statement of the date on which

Judgment was entered by the Lower Court.

Also absent is any

reference to Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment
which was filed, circulated to opposing counsel, argued, and
granted on March 23, 1988. Defendant has good reason for deleting
this information; a thorough review of the post-trial aspects of

4

the case conclusively demonstrates that Defendant's Motion for New
Trial and Notice of Appeal were not timely filed and, therefore,
this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.
A detailed account of the post-trial proceedings is necessary
to demonstrate the jurisdictional defect.

The following numbered

paragraphs recite, in detail, pertinent post-trial proceedings.
A multi-colored time line is included as Addendum 1 to clarify the
chronology of events described.

The time line depicts actions of

the Lower Court in black, the Defendant in blue, and the Plaintiff
in red.
1.

On December 8, 1987, the jury returned Special Verdicts

which awarded the Plaintiff an amount of $19,584.01 on its claim
and awarded nothing to Defendant on its counterclaim.
2.

On December 18, 1987, counsel for Plaintiff submitted

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment to the
Lower Court after first delivering them to opposing counsel.

The

Findings, Conclusions and Judgment were consistent with the Special
verdicts returned by the jury.
3.

(Addendum 2)

On January 4, 1988, counsel for Defendant filed a blanket

objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
alleging that they were unsupported by the evidence.

Defendant's

Notice of Objection was filed well after the time to object had
expired pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice for
District and Circuit Courts in effect at that time.
4.

(Addendum 3)

Simultaneous with its objections, Defendant filed its own

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Defendant's Findings and
5

Conclusions,

inconsistent

with

the

jury's

Special

Verdicts,

purported to award Defendant $19,012.00 for delay damages and
$83,970.30 for damages relating to the alleged cost overrun on the
gymnasium.
5.
a

(Addendum 4)
On January 20, 1988, the Lower Court scheduled and held

lengthy hearing

on Defendant's

objections to the proposed

Findings and Conclusions. The Lower Court resolved all objections
by specifying several changes to be made in the Findings (the
majority of changes related to interest calculations) and finding
the remainder of Findings and all Conclusions to be adequate.
6.

In Judge Wahlquist's ruling on Defendant's subsequent

Motion for New Trial, he stated, "After verdict, the lawyers
disputed over what the Court's Findings of Fact, etc., should be.
A lengthy hearing was held.

All rulings were made in open court

in the presence of counsel.

Everyone knew what the findings of

fact and conclusions of law were to say before they were finally
drafted."
7.

(Addendum 5)
One day later, on January 21, 1988, counsel for Plaintiff

drafted new Findings of Fact incorporating the revisions announced
by the Court.

The revised Findings, along with the approved

Conclusions of Law, were mailed to Judge Wahlquist with a cover
letter requesting that he enter the same if no objection was
received from Defendant's counsel within the period provided by the
Rules of Practice.

Copies of the Findings and Conclusions were

hand delivered to Defendant's counsel on that same date with a copy
of the cover letter sent to Judge Wahlquist.
6

8.

Once again Defendant's counsel objected to the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Defendant's Notice of Objection

was hand-delivered to Plaintiff's counsel on January 28, 1988 and
was mailed

to the Lower Court

in Ogden, arriving

expiration of the time for objections.
9.

after the

(Addendum 6)

Defendant's second set of objections, like its first set

of objections, allege that the Findings and Conclusions were
unsupported by the evidence. On that basis, the Defendant objected
to

(1) the majority of the Findings that the Lower Court had

approved on January 20, 1988 as originally drafted; (2) objected
to the specific Findings announced by Judge Wahlquist in open court
on January 20, 1988; and (3) objected to the Conclusions of Law
which were identical to those originally submitted to the Lower
Court and approved on January 20, 1988.
10.

On February 1, 1988, Judge Wahlquist signed the proposed

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and entered them
in accordance with Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judge Wahlquist noted on the Judgment that the issue of costs be
reserved.
11.

(Addendum 7)
On March 2, 1988, Plaintiff commenced execution on the

Judgment by causing the Lower Court to issue a Writ of Garnishment
against First Security Bank on March 2, 1988.
12.

Plaintiff provided Defendant with a Notice of Entry of

Judgment on March 7, 1988.
13.

(Addendum 8)

On March 23, 1988, at a hearing scheduled for the purpose

of taxing costs, Defendant's counsel submitted a Rule 60 Motion for
7

Relief from Judgment, unaccompanied by supporting memoranda, to the
Lower Court and to counsel for Plaintiff.
14.

(Addendum 9)

Without prior notice, Defendant's counsel proceeded to

argue that counsel for Plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct
for failure to provide Notice of Entry of Judgment to Defendant
until the time for appeal had expired. Defendant's counsel argued,
on that basis, that the Judgment should be set aside and reentered
to allow Defendant an opportunity to file a Motion for New Trial
or Notice of Appeal.
15.

(Record at 888-890)

Over Plaintiff's objection, Judge Wahlquist ordered that

the Judgment be "re-entered" as of March 23, 1988, "for the
purposes of post-trial motions and notice of appeal."

(Addendum

10)
16.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

signed on February 1, 1988 were not modified nor affected by the
Lower Court's order granting Defendant relief from Judgment.
17.

On April 1, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial

which Judge Wahlquist

subsequently

denied

on April

25, 1989

(Defendant's Brief, page 4.)
18.

Subsequent to the Lower Court's denial of Defendant's

Motion for New Trial, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 2,
1989.

(Record at 949.)

8

A.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL,
OR OTHER POST-TRIAL MOTION WHICH WOULD HAVE TOLLED
THE TIME FOR FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL, WITHIN
THIRTY (3 0) DAYS OF THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON 0
FEBRUARY 1, 1988.

The Judgment entered on February 1, 1988, was valid in all
aspects.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a proposed

Judgment

were

duly

served

on

opposing

counsel

before

being

presented to the Lower Court for signature in compliance with Rule
2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice for District and Circuit Courts.
Even though Defendant's objection was untimely under Rule 2.91, the
Lower Court afforded Defendant a full opportunity to be heard in
the hearing of January 20, 1988.

The Findings and Conclusions,

revised according to the Lower Court's instruction, were then again
served on Defendant's counsel before submission to the Lower Court.
When no objection had been received by the Lower Court during
eleven (11) days following service of the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment on Defendant's counsel, the Lower Court signed and entered
the Judgment.

Under these facts, Defendant may not now complain

that the Judgment was not properly filed and entered within the
meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See

Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co.. 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986).

x

Rule 2.9(b):
Copies of the proposed findings, judgment,
and/or orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to the
court and counsel within five (5) days after service. (Rule 2.9
has been replaced by Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration without change in text).
9

Even had Defendants second set of objections been timely
filed, they would have had no effect on the finality of the
Judgment,

The Defendant's second set of objections, which were

for practical purposes identical to the first set of objections,
are barred by the "law of the case".

Defendant's objection that

the Findings and Conclusions were not supported by the evidence
adduced at trial had been previously raised and argued before the
Lower Court and decided.
There must be finality, a time when the case in the
trial court is really over and the loser must appeal or
give up. Successive post-judgment motions interfere with
that policy and justice is not served by permitting the
losing party to string out his attack on a judgment over
a period of months, one argument at a time, or to make
the first motion a rehearsal for the real thing the next
month.
Sears v. Sears, 422 N.E. 2d 610, 611 (111. 1981), cited with
approval in Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,
969 (Utah App. 1989).
572

P.2d

395,

397

See also Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.f
(Utah

1977);

Conder

v.

A.L. Williams

&

Associates. Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah App. 1987).
The record unequivocally reflects that Defendant failed to
file a Notice of Appeal or any other post-trial motion within the
allotted thirty (3 0) days following the February 1, 1988, Entry of
Judgment. By referring to the time line at Addendum 1, it is clear
that Defendant failed to file any motion whatsoever until March 23,
1988, approximately fifty (50) days after the Entry of Judgment.
Further, it is clear that Defendants 60(b) Motion filed on March

10

23 would not interrupt the running of the time for appeal even had
it been filed during the allotted time for appeal.
A 60(b) motion does not extend or toll the thirty day
period within which appeals in the original action must
be filed. See Rules of Utah Supreme Court 4(b).
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987).

Therefore, the

first post-Judgment motion filed by Defendant which conceivably
could have had an effect on the Judgment was its Motion for New
Trial dated April 1, 1988, approximately 60 days after the Entry
of Judgment.
Defendant's failure to file a Notice of Appeal or a post-trial
Motion which would suspend or toll the running of the time for
appeal2 is fatal to the appeal. Failure to file within the 30 days
provided in Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court strips
the court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. Burgers v. Maiben,
652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980);
In Re Estate of Ratliff, 431 P.2d 571 (Utah 1967).

The Utah

Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals are specifically
precluded from extending the time for appeal by Rule 22(b) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and Rule 22(b) of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals, respectively:

2

Rule 4(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court lists only
4 post-trial motions which will suspend the running of the 30 day
period:
1.
Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict;
2.
Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend or Make Additional Findings;
3.
Rule 59(b) Motion for a New Trial; and
4.
Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
11

(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause shown
may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by these
rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit
any act to be done after the expiration of such time, but
the court may not enlarge the time for filing a Notice
of Appeal . . . except as specifically authorized by law.
. . . (emphasis added)
It is apparent from the face of the record that this Court
lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.

An inquiry of jurisdictional

scope is appropriately raised at any point in the proceeding.

The

issue of jurisdiction may be raised by either party or by the Court
sua sponte when it appears on the face of the record.

Albertson

v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); Neider v. State, 665 P.2d 1306
(Utah 1983).
Presumably,

Defendant

will

argue

that

the

facial

jurisdictional defect is cured by the Lower Court's grant of its
March 23, 1988 Motion for Relief from Judgment; in granting the
60(b) Motion, the Lower Court declared the effective date of Entry
of Judgment to be March 23, 1988 rather than February 1, 1988,
thereby extending the time for a Notice of Appeal or post-trial
Motion.

Therefore it is necessary to examine the validity of the

Lower Court's actions and the rationales upon which it relied.
B.

THE LOWER COURT CANNOT EXTEND THE TIME FOR APPEAL
BY GRANTING RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AFTER THE TIME FOR
APPEAL HAS EXPIRED.

The sole and exclusive means by which the time for filing an
appeal can be extended after the thirty (30) day period has expired
is pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and
its counterpart in the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

In

1955, the Utah Supreme Court observed that "[Rule 73(a) of the Utah
12

Rules of Civil Procedure] prescribes the only circumstance under
which the court may extend the time for filing notice of appeal."3
Anderson v. Anderson, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (Utah 1955).

The Anderson

court indicated further that a trial court cannot extend the time
for filing a Notice of Appeal by granting relief from Judgment
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when a Notice
of Appeal has not been filed in time.

Id.

In Utah, relief from a Judgment may be obtained from the trial
court or the appellate court by utilizing separate and distinct
procedures.

The trial court may grant certain forms of relief

under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b) or 59(e) if relief is requested
within ten (10) days of the Entry of Judgment.
between

these

rules

and

separate

relief

The interplay

requested

from

the

appellate court can be compared to the function of the esophagus
and trachea.

If the movant has timely pursued relief from the

trial court he is not required to pursue an appeal at the same
time.

The treatment of a Rule 60(b) motion is, however, quite

different.
A 60(b) motion by its own terms "does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation."

Therefore, the movant

must pursue the 60(b) Motion and appellate relief simultaneously,
including filing a Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the

3

In 1985 when the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the provisions for extending the time of
appeal found in Rule 73a were incorporated into Rule 4(e) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, with certain substantive changes
which are discussed in Section C below.
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Entry of Judgment.

In the present case, Defendant erroneously

relies on its 60(b) motion filed fifty (50) days after the Entry
of Judgment to cure the jurisdictional defect of failing to file
a timely Notice of Appeal.

If this were possible, a trial court

could extend the time for appeal by several months, or even years,
by granting a 60(b) motion at some distant point. The effect would
be to obliterate the 30 day time limit for appeals and the limited
provisions for extending the time for appeal under Rule 4(e) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
In Holbrook v. Hodson, 466 P.2d 843 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the same type of "end run"
around the appellate rules which Defendant now attempts.
case, Judgment was entered for plaintiff.

In that

Defendant thereafter

filed an untimely motion for new trial. After the time for filing
an appeal had passed, defendant realized his motion for new trial
was untimely and moved pursuant to Rule 60(b) for relief from the
late filing.

The trial court subsequently granted the motion for

relief from the late filing but denied the motion for new trial.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal within thirty days of the
denial of new trial.

The Utah Supreme Court denied the appeal,

reasoning that the trial court's grant of a 60(b) motion, after the
time for appeal has expired, cannot reinstate the appeal.

"There

is no manner by which the district court can then subsequently
confer jurisdiction upon this court."

Id. at 845.

The Holbrook decision is dispositive of the present case.
Defendant, like the defendant in Holbrook, filed a 60(b) motion
14

after the time for appeal had expired.

In Holbrook, the defendant

sought relief from an untimely filing.

In the present case the

Defendant seeks relief for a complete failure to file within the
time prescribed by law.

Both trial courts attempted, by granting

60(b) relief, to retroactively reinstate the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. The present case, therefore, must suffer the same
fate as Holbrook.
C.

THE GROUNDS FOR GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 60(b) MOTION
DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXTENSION UNDER
RULE 4(e), RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.

Defendant's 60(b) motion in reality was not for relief from
the Judgment. Nor did the Lower Court grant relief from Judgment.
Rather,

Defendant's

60(b)

motion

was

for

relief

from

the

jurisdictional defect of failing to file a timely Notice of Appeal.
Ultimately, the Lower Court purportedly granted relief from the
failure to file a timely appeal, not from the Judgment itself.
However, Defendant's error was not simply in mislabelling the
requested relief. The grounds advanced by Defendant simply did not
justify an extension of time to appeal.
Defendant

in

support

of

requested

The grounds submitted by

Rule

60

relief

was

that

Plaintiff's counsel failed to give Defendant notice of Entry of
Judgment until the time

for appeal had

expired

and thereby

prevented the defendant from moving for a new trial under Rule 59
or filing a notice of appeal. Based on that sole rationale, Judge
Wahlquist granted the 60(b) motion, purportedly relieving Defendant
from its failure to file a timely appeal.

In a letter written on

the same day that Judge Wahlquist granted the 60(b) motion,
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Defendant's

counsel

describes

Judge Wahlquist's

reasoning

in

granting the motion.
Judge Wahlquist said that it was apparent to him that
whoever lost at trial would want to appeal, and so there
was a real prejudice in the plaintiff not notifying us
of the entry of judgment, and so judgment would be
reentered as of today so that we could file a motion for
new trial and/or appeal. (Addendum 11)
The basis on which Defendant's Motion for Relief was submitted
and admittedly decided does not satisfy the requirements necessary
for an extension of time to appeal under Rule 4(e). Rule 4(e) of
the Rules of Utah Supreme Court provides, in part:
The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect
or good cause may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon motion filed not later than thirty days after
the expiration of the time prescribed by subparagraph (a)
of this rule. . . .
By reading Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in
conjunction with Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
it is obvious that the Plaintiff's failure to give notice of Entry
of Judgment cannot constitute excusable neglect or good cause.
Rule 58A(d) provides:
The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing of entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this
provision.
Rule

58A(d)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

clearly

demonstrates that the failure to give Notice of Entry of Judgment,
as a matter of law, does not constitute excusable neglect nor good
cause for extending the time within which to file a notice of
appeal pursuant to Rule 4(e).
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The clear intent of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Appellate Rules is illustrated by reviewing specific changes made
to the rules and the development of the current rules.

Prior to

January 1, 1985, Rule 73(a) provided:
(a) When and how taken. When an appeal is permitted
from a District court to the Supreme Court, the time
within which an appeal may be taken shall be one month
from the entry of the judgment or order appealed from
unless a shorter time is provided by law, except that
upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure
of a party to learn of the entry of judgment, the
district court in any action may extend the time for
appeal not exceeding one month from the expiration of the
original time herein prescribed. (emphasis added)
With the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1985,
the failure of a party to receive notice of entry of judgment,
which had been hailed by Utah Courts as the only circumstance under
which the trial courts might extend the time for filing a notice
of appeal, (Anderson v. Anderson, supra. Holbrook v. Hodson,
supra), was deleted from the rule.

Almost concurrently, Rule

58A(d) was amended in 1986 to add the final sentence, "However, the
time for filing a Notice of Appeal is not affected by the notice
requirement of this provision,"
The changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate
Rules evidence a clear intent to eliminate failure to give or
receive notice of entry of judgment as a basis for extending the
time of appeal. Under the present rules of the Utah Supreme Court
"excusable neglect" is governed by a strict standard.

Prowswood.

Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
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The

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court explains:
Excusable neglect and good cause under this paragraph
refer generally to an extraordinary circumstance that
prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of
appeal and not to inadvertence or oversight on the part
of counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize
an appeal.
Under the facts of the present case, Plaintiff's failure to
provide Notice of Entry

of Judgment

does not constitute an

extraordinary circumstance that prevented the Defendant from filing
a timely notice of appeal.

As discussed above, two separate sets

of Findings and Conclusions were submitted to Defendant's counsel,
a lengthy hearing was held on Defendant's objections to the
proposed Findings and Conclusions, the Lower Court announced its
Findings and Conclusions in open court and Defendant's counsel knew
or had reason to know of the imminence of Entry of Judgment. Under
those circumstances, Defendant's failure to file a timely Notice
of Appeal was, most likely, a result of inadvertence, oversight or
a lack of vigilance on the part of counsel.

At a minimum,

Defendant's counsel apparently did not inquire nor attempt to
ascertain whether Judgment had been entered for more than five
weeks

following his receipt of the Findings, Conclusion and

Judgment which were ultimately signed and entered by the Lower
Court.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM PURSUING THIS APPEAL BY THE
DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS OF
JUDGMENT.
On April 25, 1989, Judge Wahlquist denied Defendant's Motion
for New Trial, holding that Defendant's payment of the full
Judgment amount constituted a complete end to the matter and
estopped Defendant from seeking a limited new trial.

(Addendum 5)

Judge Wahlquist's ruling is not only dispositive of Defendant's
Motion for a New Trial but is also dispositive of this appeal.
Utah courts have consistently held since the case of Sierra Nevada
Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., 156 P. 946 (Utah 1916) that when a
Judgment is voluntarily paid, the amount accepted, and the Judgment
satisfied, "the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal
is waived."

Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973).

Under the facts of the present case and applicable law, no basis
exists for disturbing this matter, which came to final rest on
April 14, 1988.

A brief review of only a few facts is necessary

to verify Judge Wahlquist's conclusion. The facts set forth below
are also included in the multi-colored time line at Addendum 1.
1.

On March 2, 1988, Plaintiff began executing on
its Judgment by serving a Writ of Garnishment
on Defendant's bank.

2.

On March 8 in a telephone conversation, Defendant's
counsel agreed to immediately deliver a check in the
amount of $19,634.71 and the remainder of the
Judgment balance within 30 days if Plaintiff would
suspend its execution attempts. Plaintiff agreed
and received the partial payment that same day.

3.

On April 4, 1988, Defendant hand-delivered a check
for the remaining Judgment balance
and a
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Satisfaction of Judgment to counsel for Plaintiff.
4.

On April 6, 1988, Defendant's counsel mailed
Plaintiff a Satisfaction of Judgment which had been
revised at the request of Plaintiff's counsel.

5.

On April 14, 1988, Plaintiff's counsel executed the
Satisfaction of Judgment and filed it with the Lower
Court.

In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme
Court stated as a general rule that one who accepts a benefit under
a Judgment is estopped from later attacking the Judgment on appeal,
and one who acquiesces in a Judgment cannot later attack it.
Hence, in the present case, Defendant may not appeal having
acquiesced by payment of the Judgment; Plaintiff may not appeal
having accepted the benefit of payment.

Utah courts have also

recognized that a party paying a Judgment may accept benefits of
the Judgment and thereby be precluded from appeal. Trees at

613.

By paying the Judgment, Defendant obtained the benefit of avoiding
execution and
by

avoiding

additional costs and interest. Defendant benefited
Plaintiff's

appeal

of

the

Judgment,

which

was

significantly smaller than prayed for in the Complaint.
Defendant now claims that the only portion of the case at rest
is plaintiff's Complaint.
Counterclaim

Defendant alleges, however, that its

for approximately

$150,000.00 remains vital even

though the Satisfaction of Judgment drafted by Defendant's counsel
fails to reference any intention to preserve the right of appeal
upon any portion of the case.

In Hollinasworth v. Farmers

Insurance Co. . 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
refused to sanction such tactics.
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There, a Judgment creditor

drafted a general Satisfaction of Judgment with no reference to an
intent to appeal any portion of the case. Thereafter, the Judgment
creditor attempted to appeal a portion of the Judgment.

The Utah

Supreme Court refused to allow the appeal, ruling that absent some
contrary expression in the Satisfaction of Judgment, the matter was
completely at rest and the right to appeal foreclosed.
One of the basic policies of the doctrines of "acceptance of
benefits" and acquiescence is to avoid the "surprise attack"
tactics which Defendant now seeks to employ.
The rule embodies a valid protection of the successful
party in the trial court. An appellant who accepts the
benefits of a judgment from which he is appealing
accomplishes a significant shift in the burden of risks;
he exposes the respondent to the possibility not only to
a possible loss on appeal, but also the potential loss
of the benefit he has provided to the appellant,
(emphasis added)
Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d at 613.

Defendant should not be allowed

to lull Plaintiff into foregoing any appeal of the matter while
secretly harboring the intent to subsequently appeal a portion of
the Judgment from which only it may benefit.
Defendant relies on the fact that counsel for Plaintiff struck
out general release language in the April 4, 1988 Satisfaction of
Judgment.

(Brief of Defendant, page 4.)

In reality, the language

stricken out was a unilateral release of the Defendant from any
further liability.

In light of the fact that the satisfaction

itself is a general release of both parties the deleted language
was superfluous.
exclusion

of

Under the Hollinasworth case, the inclusion or

the

stricken

language
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would

not

justify

the

Defendant's subsequent appeal.

In Judge Wahlquist's April 25

ruling, he also rejected this argument, stating:
The release in question was executed by plaintiff's
attorneys at the invitations of defense counsel. It is,
in its general terms, a complete release. Neither side
should be permitted to set aside this release.
The
defendant should be estopped to ask for a limited trial.
(Addendum 4)
The requested appeal of Defendant's counterclaims doesn't fall
within an exception to the general rule which precludes a postSatisfaction appeal.

Defendant alleges that the doctrines of

Acquiescence and Acceptance of Benefit do not preclude an appeal
of its counterclaim alone because it is a separate and distinct
claim. The Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Eddy, supra, recognized
an exception to the general rule under the following circumstances:
If a judgment is entered as to one part of a controversy,
which is separate and distinct from another part, and
disposition of the latter cannot affect the disposition
of the former, a party may accept the money or property
to which he is entitled and not be deemed to waive his
right to appeal as to other independent claims which the
court refused to grant. Id.
Unfortunately, Defendant's Counterclaim is not a separate,
distinct, independent claim. The Lower Court so ruled in his April
25 ruling on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial:
The issues are so interwoven that it would be illogical
to permit the defendant to pick and choose from the
accounting, etc., and the delay in construction events,
issues only that he wishes to be granted a new trial on.
These issues that he chooses to present at a new trial
are interwoven with the other issues and cannot in an
intelligent manner be separated. (Addendum 5)
The

issues

of

construction

costs, delays, and

overruns

are

inextricably interwoven in the threads of both the counterclaim and
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complaint.

The jury's award to Plaintiff was premised, in part,

on the finding that Plaintiff was not responsible for delays and
overruns.

Therefore, an appeal of Defendant's

Counterclaims

unavoidably effects the other part of the judgment and is barred.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IS NOT GROUNDS FOR UPSETTING THE JURY
VERDICT.
Defendant complains that the Lower Court improperly failed to
give

its requested Jury

Instructions

1, 2

(Counterclaim

for

gymnasium cost overruns) 3, and 4 (Counterclaim for delay damages) .
Defendant's requested jury instructions 1 through 4 are, in fact,
stock jury instructions unrelated to its Counterclaims.

For the

purpose of responding to Defendant's Brief, Plaintiff has assumed
that Defendant intended to address the Lower Court's failure to
give Defendant's requested jury instructions 9, 10 (Counterclaim
for gymnasium

cost

overman)

11, and

12

(Counterclaim

delay

damages).
A.

DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE LOWER COURT'S
FAILURE TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 11 AND 12
AND, THEREFORE, MAY NOT RAISE IT ON APPEAL.

Prior to instructing the jury and closing argument, the Lower
Court distributed jury instructions it intended to give, and gave
counsel the opportunity to review them and place objections, if
any, on the record.

(Transcript at page 602.) Defendant's counsel

placed several objections on the record but failed to object to the
Court's refusal to give instructions 11 and 12.
through 608.)

(Transcript 606

Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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provides, in pertinent part, "no party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto."

Therefore, Defendant may not now for the first time on

appeal raise that issue.
Rule 51 goes on to state, "Notwithstanding the foregoing
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the
interests of justice may review the giving or failure to give an
instruction." While the appellate court may, if it chooses, depart
from the general rule and review the failure to give an instruction
for which no objection was raised at the trial court, such
departures are only made "under unusual circumstances where the
interests of justice urgently so demand"

(citations omitted),

Williams v. Lloyd, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (Utah 1965). Furthermore, the
party pursuing the appeal has the burden to present persuasive
reasons why the appellate court should invoke such discretion. E.
A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy and Sons, 665 P.2d
132 0 (Utah 1983).

In the instant case, Defendant has advanced no

reason whatsoever why this Court should invoke its discretion and
depart from the general rule. Under the circumstances, Defendant's
appeal of the Lower Court's failure to give requested instructions
11 and 12 must be rejected.
Even ignoring Defendant's failure to preserve its objection
at trial, independent grounds exist for rejecting the appeal.
Instructions 11 and 12 relate to Defendant's counterclaim allegedly
caused by Plaintiff's construction delays.

Defendant's theory of

delay damages was adequately presented to the jury in special
24

interrogatories 5A and 5B with their accompanying explanation.
(Record at pages 632, 633.)

In 1987 this Court rejected an

appellant's claim that the trial court failed to instruct the jury
on his theory
instruction.

of the claim by

failing

to

give

a

specific

Joraensen v. ISSA, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah 1987).

In

denying the appeal, the Court stated, "It is not prejudicial error
to fail to use specific instructions if the substance of the
requested

instruction

is covered

in the instructions given."

Stratton v. Nielsen, 477 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1970).

The court

explained, "The exact language need not be given but the basic
theory espoused must be explained to the jury in ordinary, concise
and understandable language."

Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878,

880 (Utah 1974).
The evidence adduced at trial proved conclusively that the
completion dates included in the contract were target dates only.
Alan Lipman, Defendant's president, was asked if the completion
dates were estimates.

He responded, "I guess they were target

dates. Estimates to me is a broad based guess. Sure, they weren't
hard, there was no guarantee in that contract that if they didn't
finish it on such and such a date that there was a penalty."
(Transcript page 307.)

In the absence of a contractual duty to

complete construction on a specific date, Interrogatory No. 5A and
its accompanying

explanation accurately

charge the jury with

determining if the Plaintiff had unreasonably delayed completion.
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B.

THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS 9
AND 10 WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

[The failure to give a requested instruction] is not
reversible if it is not material; or it did not seriously
affect or alter the result; or cause no substantial
injury to the complaining party; or if the introduction
could not in any event have benefited the party
requesting it. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added)
75 Am. Jur.2d Trial Section 589 (1962).

In refusing to give

instructions 9 and 10, Judge Wahlquist stated that an award under
the counterclaim theory would necessarily be offset by the value
of the benefit conferred on Defendant. Therefore, Defendant could
not have benefited from the instructions had they been given.
(Transcript page 606.)
A brief review of undisputed facts condensed from Defendant's
witnesses in the trial transcript verifies the correctness of Judge
Wahlquistfs ruling:
1.

The agreement entered into between Plaintiff

and Defendant was a cost plus contract (testimony of
architect Mike Sanders, Transcript page 36; testimony of
Alan Lipman, Transcript page 3 01).
paid

the

cost

percentage

of

of
5

construction
percent

for

Plaintiff was to be
plus

profit

a

mark-up

and

or

overhead

(Transcript page 19).
2.

The contract was performed under a "fast track"

construction

mode.

(Testimony

of

Mike

Sanders,

Transcript page 36; testimony of Alan Lipman, Transcript
page 303). In fast track construction a contractor is
selected and begins work prior to the completion of plans
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and specifications.

Final construction documents are

completed during the course of construction (Transcript
page 17).
3.

The architect, prior to completing construction

plans or specifications, estimated

the cost of the

gymnasium remodeling to be $48,239,

That amount was

included in the contract as a "budgetary target price"
(Transcript page 42) .
constitute

a

hard

The budgetary target did not

dollar

figure

or

firm

bid

for

completing construction (Transcript pages 325, 531).
4.

Plaintiff remodeled or renovated the gymnasium

according

to

(Transcript

plan

page

in

80) .

a

good

workmanlike

The work

was

manner.

completed

in

accordance with the architect's plans and specifications
despite Plaintiff's request to make modifications in
order to reduce costs (Transcript pages 127 through 141) .
The architect admitted that construction could not have
been completed, according to his plans for the amounts
he estimated (Transcript page 77).
5.

All witnesses

testified

that the

$137,000

charged by Plaintiff actually represented the value of
the gymnasium improvements. None of the costs submitted
were erroneous, trumped-up or falsified (Transcript pages
88, 314-316).
When Alan

Lipman was

asked

if

the

$137,000

accurately

represented the value of improvements to the gymnasium he responded
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"basically the overall value I guess is there.
couldn't afford.

It's value that we

It's value that we didn't want to spend"

(Transcript page 314). Mr. Lipman's testimony accurately depicts
the basis of Defendant's Counterclaim

for the return of the

difference between what Defendant hoped the cost would be and what
the cost actually was.

Defendant does not claim that it did not

ask for the improvements performed by Plaintiff.

Defendant does

not claim that it got more or less than what it asked for.
Defendant does not claim that Plaintiff promised to perform the
work for a fixed price. Nor does Defendant claim that Plaintiff's
bill misrepresents the actual value of the work performed.

What

Defendant does claim is that it cost more than what it had
anticipated or wanted to pay.

No such cause of action exists in

American jurisprudence.
The record is devoid of any allegation that Plaintiff acted
as an intermeddler, volunteer or otherwise forced an unwanted
benefit on Defendant.

Defendant requested that the work be

performed, Plaintiff performed the work in accordance with the
plans and specifications provided.

The work was performed by the

Plaintiff with the reasonable expectation that it would be paid for
the value of its services under a cost plus contract.

And,

Plaintiff's bill was equal to the value of the services rendered.
Under these circumstances, even if Defendant had a valid cause of
action, quantum meruit would offset anything awarded to Defendant.
Therefore, under the facts of the case and pertinent law Judge
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Wahlquis^s refusal to give requested jury instructions 9 and 10
was correct.
POINT IV
REFERENCES TO THE ARCHITECT AS AGENT OF THE DEFENDANT
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Based on the facts of the case, the architect probably was the
agent of the Defendant.

However, even if no agency existed, the

instructions given are not clearly erroneous.

At page 13 of

Defendant's Brief Defendant cites 5 Am. Jur.2d Architects Section
6 (1962) for the general proposition that "An architect, as far as
preparation

of

plans

contractor . . . "

is

concerned,

acts

as

an

independent

The language in the ellipsis which Defendant

chose to omit is "but so far as regards the performance of his
supervisory functions with respect to a building under construction
he ordinarily acts as the agent and representative of the person
for whom the work is being done."

Id. at page 668.

In the present case the architect (1) designed and prepared
plans

(Transcript

page

13);

(2)

solicited

proposals

from

contractors (Transcript page 15); (3) interviewed the contractors
(Transcript
Plaintiff

page

17); (4) drafted

(Transcript

page

3 6) ;

Defendant's
(5)

contract with

reviewed

all

payment

applications for Defendant (Transcript page 54) ; (6) supervised
construction and attended weekly construction meetings (Transcript
page 424) ; and

(7) performed

final inspections and certified

completion of the construction (Transcript page 80).
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Under the facts of the case Judge Wahlquist's characterization
of the architect as the Defendant's agent was most likely correct.
However, even if the architect was, in fact, not the agent of the
Defendant, no prejudicial error occurred. The scope of Defendant's
appeal is limited, by its own terms, to the counterclaim.

Special

Interrogatory No. 5A, consistent with Defendant's counterclaim,
requested the jury to determine if Plaintiff was responsible for
the construction delays (Transcript page 632) .

If, as the jury

determined, the Plaintiff was not responsible for the delay,
Defendant

has

failed

to

counterclaim, causation.

prove

an

essential

element

of

its

See Highland Construction Co. v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Utah 1984).
If Plaintiff did not cause Defendant's damages it makes no
difference who did, unless Plaintiff can be held responsible for
the actions of that party.

Clearly, Plaintiff was not responsible

for the architect's acts.

The architect, under its contract, may

or may not have been an agent of the Defendant; however, the
architect certainly was not an agent of Plaintiff or otherwise in
privity of contract.

Therefore, as it relates to Defendant's

counterclaim against Plaintiff, the Lower Court's characterization
of the architect as the Defendant's agent is not clearly erroneous.
POINT V
THE
LOWER
COURT'S
BURDEN
OF
PROOF
INSTRUCTION
ACCOMPANYING SPECIAL INTERROGATORY 5B IS NOT SUBJECT TO
APPEAL NOR IS IT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The burden of proof issue raised by Defendant at page 14 of
Defendant's brief is, again, raised for the first time on appeal.
30

Defendant failed to object to the burden of proof aspect of
Interrogatory 5B and its accompanying explanation (Transcript pages
606 through 608). As stated above in Point III(A), a party may not
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects at the trial level.

Rule 51 specifically

provides, "In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds for his objection."

The objection must be sufficiently

specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47
(Utah 1974) ; E. A. Strout Western Realty v. W. C. Foy and Sons, 665
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983).
The trial record is totally devoid of any reference to the
burden of proof issue or the grounds for an objection thereto.
Likewise, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any extraordinary or
special circumstance which would necessitate an invocation of this
Court's discretion to consider the matter.

Therefore, the issue

is not properly presented on appeal.
Even if Defendant's failure to object at the trial level is
disregarded, Defendant's appeal fails on its facts.

Defendant's

brief asserts that Plaintiff's argument, that the Defendant or
architect actually caused the delay, is an affirmative defense for
which Plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Defendant misconstrues
the burdens of the respective parties.
Defendant

bears

counterclaim.

the burden

of proving

As Counterclaimant,
the

elements

of

its

Lima School District No. 12 v. Simonson. 683 P.2d
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471,

477

(Montana

1984) .

One of the essential

elements of

Defendant's counterclaim for delay damages is that Plaintiff's acts
legally caused its damage, or causation. See Highland Construction
Co., supra at 1047.

The Lower Court's specific instruction that

"The defendant must bear the burden of proof, and prove that some
delays were unreasonably caused by the plaintiff . . . "

merely

restates the general rule that a claimant must show that a
particular defendant caused it damages in order to recover.

No

affirmative defense of any nature relieves Defendant from proving
the essential elements of its claim.
POINT VI
THIS APPEAL IS SO FRIVOLOUS THAT THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFF.
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides as
follows:
If the court shall determine that a motion made or
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the
prevailing party.
In O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987), the
Utah Court of Appeals defined a frivolous appeal as "one having no
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)."

The

Court of Appeals realized this may create a lesser standard than
the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-27-56 (1953, as
amended) , but "since a party has already been to court once and has
had the benefit of one ruling, the decision to appeal should be
reached only after careful consideration by the party and counsel."
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O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 310. See Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah
1983) (construing the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. Section
78-27-56 (1953, as amended)).
In Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Utah App.
1988), the court awarded the plaintiff costs and attorney fees,
finding that the defendant failed to make a timely appeal. Here,
Defendant seeks to appeal even though it failed to file any posttrial motion

for over 50 days after the Entry of Judgment.

Additionally, Defendant is appealing a Judgment for which it sought
and received a Satisfaction of Judgment.

Finally, Defendant

attempts to appeal jury instructions to which it failed to object
at trial, without presenting any circumstance justifying review.
This makes the Defendant's position as egregious as that of the
defendant in Barber.
The Court of Appeals has also cited with approval Auburn
Harpswell Association v. Day, 438 A.2d 234 (Me. 1981), which helps
define when imposition of sanctions is appropriate.
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988).

Porco v.

The court in Day said

that sanctions should be applied when "an appeal is obviously
without any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood
of prevailing, and results in delayed

implementation

of the

judgment of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and
dissipation of time and resources of the Law Court." Day, 438 A.2d
at 239.

Here, for the reasons stated above, Defendant has

certainly increased the cost of litigation and caused a dissipation
of the time and resources of this Court.
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Furthermore, Defendant

is appealing a Judgment which is not appealable and has been
voluntarily satisfied.
Neither Defendant nor its counsel reached the decision to
appeal "after careful consideration."

O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 310.

Had they carefully considered the facts and law they would have
realized that there is no legal or factual basis for this appeal.
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App.
1988); Briaham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1988).
The record
frivolous.
appropriate

in this case leaves no doubt that the appeal is
Therefore,
case

Plaintiff

in which

to

suggests

award

that

double

this

costs

is

an

(including

attorney's fees) and damages, and remand the matter to the Lower
Court for a determination of attorneys' fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that Defendant's
appeal be denied, that the matter be set finally to rest and that
Plaintiff be awarded damages and double costs (including attorneys'
fees) incurred in defending against the appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£ ^day of October, 1989.
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS

Michael J. Wilkins
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 1989, I
hereby caused four true and correct copies of Respondent's Brief
to be hand-delivered to the following counsel of record:
Edward J. McDonough
50 South Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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ADDENDUM 2

Michael J. Wilkins, #3470
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5775
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

)
)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

vs.

)

ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,
Defendants.

)
)

CIVIL NO. 94630

)

Judge Wahlquist

After trial to the Court with an advisory jury, and upon
receipt by the court of the findings of the jury with respect to
those matters submitted to it by special interrogatories, the
Court

makes

and

enters

the

following

Findings

of Fact and

Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
16,

1984

The parties entered into a written agreement on July
by

which

plaintiff

agreed

to

supply

construction

services and materials at the St. Joseph High School in Ogden,
Utah.
2.

The contract language was drafted by defendant's agent.

3.

Defendant

agreed

to pay plaintiff

the

construction

costs allowed in the contract plus a 5% supervision fee.
1

4.

Although the contract between the parties designates

dates for substantial completion of September 21, 1984 for work
on the gym and November 30, 1984 for work on the classroom and
library, these dates were target dates and no specific penalty
was to be attached to the failure of the plaintiff to meet these
dates.
5.

Although the contract between the parties designates

budgetary target prices of $48,239 for the gym work and $299,953
for the

classroom/library

work, these amounts were estimates

only, and were not binding upon plaintiff.
6.

No

guaranteed

maximum

cost was

agreed

between

the

parties at the time the contract was executed or thereafter.
7.

All

of

the

work

expected

of

plaintiff

under

the

contract was completed prior to May 13, 1985.
8.

On May 28, 1985 the work of plaintiff was certified by

defendant's architect as having fully met the requirements of the
contract.
9.

The work of plaintiff was accepted by defendant on May

13, 1985, and occupied and used from that date forward.
10.

The work of plaintiff fully met the requirements of the

contract, and defendant at no time raised objections to plaintiff
that the work was deficient in any way.
11.

Plaintiff made demand on May 13, 1985 for final payment

of amounts owed it under the contract.
12.

On June 12, 1985, plaintiff was provided with lien

waivers and proof that all indebtedness on the project had been
2

paid.
13.

As of June 12, 1985, plaintiff was entitled to be paid

the remaining unpaid costs it had expended on the project, plus
5% as its fee.
a.

This amount included:
$8,550.70,

for

the

amount

withheld

from

the

billing submitted by E.M. Whitmeyer dated 13 May, 1985; and
b.

$2,046.30

for

payments

made

by

plaintiff

for

building permits on the project which were not included in
the Whitmeyer billing; and
c.

$3,855.00 for labor overhead paid by plaintiff on

the project and not included in the Whitmeyer building; and
d.

$5,182.71

for

miscellaneous

costs

paid

by

plaintiff on the project and not included in the Whitmeyer
building.
14.

The total amount to which plaintiff was entitled as of

June 12, 1985 was $19,634.71.
15.

Under the terms of the contract between the parties,

plaintiff is entitled to interest on unpaid funds at the rate of
1.25% per month.
16.

The interest provided for under the contract from June

12, 1985 until December 12, 1987 amounts to $8,867.30.
18.

As of December 12, 1987, the total amount of principle

and interest owed plaintiff under the contract is $28,502.01.
19.

From December

12, 1987 until the date of judgment,

interest continues to accrue at the rate of 1.25% per month on
the unpaid total of $28,502.01.
3

QM

20.

The plaintiff did not unreasonably delay completion of

the project.
21.

The defendant was not damaged by any act or failure to

act required of the plaintiff by the contract.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff committed no material breach of the contract

between the parties.
2.

Defendant

is

not

entitled

to

any

recovery

against

plaintiff on its Counterclaims.
3.

Defendant breached its obligations under the contract

by failing to pay to plaintiff the amounts due, when due.
4.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant

in the amount of $29,544.75 plus interest at 1.25% per month from
December 13, 1987 until the date of judgment, and thereafter at
the legal rate of 12% per annum, plus its costs.
Dated this

day of

, 198

.

BY THE COURT:

John F. Wahlquist
District Judge
1490P.33
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5775
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

CIVIL NO. 94630

Defendants.

Judge Wahlquist

The Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact
and its Conclusions of Law, hereby grants judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $19,634.01,
plus interest thereon in the amount of $

to the

date of judgment, plus costs of $_
of $

for a total sum

_, plus interest thereon at the rate of
% per annum until fully paid.
DATED this

day of

, 198
BY THE COURT:

John F. Wahlquist
District Judge
1490P.32
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5775
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

CIVIL NO. 94630

Defendants.

Judge Wahlquist

I here certify I caused a true and accurate copy of the
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and proposed
JUDGMENT

and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE to be delivered to

Edward J. McDonough, Esq., Berman & O'Rorke, 50 South Main,
Suite

1250,

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah

84144, this

December, 1987.
LARSEN & WILKINS

Michael J. Wilkins
1490P.44

1

/£ ^ day of

ADDENDUM 3

Edward J. McDonough, 2177
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

]i
])
>
]>

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

)
]•

Civil No. 94630

Defendant.

]

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

Defendant objects to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law submitted by the plaintiff on the grounds
that they are not accurately based upon the evidence at the
trial.

The defendant requests that the court enter the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the
defendant and submitted herewith.
DATED:

January

/

, 1988.

Edward J. McDonough v
50 South Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant
1008N

On this

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
y/7
i day of January, 1988, I hereby certify

that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following:
Kendall S. Peterson
Michael J. Wilkins
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah

1008N
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ADDENDUM 4

^ff-uMp £*-*->
Edward J. McDonough, 2177
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

\
])

Plaintiff,

|

ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

]
]>

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 94630

Defendant.

The jury made the following findings on special
interrogatories submitted to it:
1.

The request for final payment submitted by the

plaintiff's agent E.M. Whitmeyer on May 13, 1985, did not
include an amount of $2,046.30 for payments made by plaintiff
for building permits on the project; an amount of $3,855 for
labor overhead paid by the plaintiff on the project; and an
amount of $5,182.71 for miscellaneous costs paid by the
plaintiff on the project.
2.

The plaintiff did not unreasonably delay

completion of the project.

3.

The plaintiff was not entitled to charge for the

time that E.M. Whitmeyer spent at the job site.
The Court makes the following additional findings of
fact:
4.

E.M. Whitmeyer responded to an invitation from

the architect Michael Sanders to D.J. Company to submit a
proposal for remodeling and additions to St. Joseph High School.
5.

E.M. Whitmeyer submitted a proposal in the name

of the plaintiff/ explaining that the plaintiff and D.J.
Company were involved in a merger.
6.

The plaintiff and the defendant signed a written

agreement on July 16, 1984 by which plaintiff agreed to supply
construction services and materials at the St. Joseph High
School in Ogden, Utah, in connection with a remodeling and
expansion project that included two phases, the gymnasium phase
and the classroom phase.

E.M. Whitmeyer signed the agreement

on behalf of the plaintiff.
7.

E.M. Whitmeyer was the only person who

represented the plaintiff with respect to the agreement and the
carrying out of its terms.
8.

Under the terms of the written agreement, the

plaintiff was required to provide the defendant with full and
detailed accounting records so that costs of the project could
be monitored by the defendant.

The plaintiff, prior to October

1, 1984, failed to do so.

-2-

ft1 2

9.

On October 1/ 1984, the defendant was informed

for the first time that there had been a cost overrun on the
gymnasium portion of the construction project, and that the
gymnasium portion of the project cost more than 200% of the
amount budgeted for the gymnasium.
10.
project.

The defendant had a limited fund for the

Funds diverted to the gymnasium phase were not

available for the classroom phase.

The classroom phase was the

primary purpose of the fund and was more important to the
defendant than the gymnasium phase.
11.

E.M. Whitmeyer, for and on behalf of the

plaintiff, agreed to work closely with the defendant to insure
that such a cost overrun would not occur on the classroom phase
of the project.
12.

E.M. Whitmeyer met weekly thereafter with members

of the defendant for this purpose.
13.

All subsequent requests for payment submitted by

the plaintiff included specific cost figures which were
approved by the defendant.
14.

The plaintiff and defendant agreed that no

expenditures beyond those included in the cost figure attached
as a second sheet to the periodic requests for payment would be
made by the plaintiff without prior agreement of the defendant.
15.

On May 13, 1985, E.M. Whitmeyer, for and on

behalf of the plaintiff, submitted a final request for payment

-3-

in an amount which coincided with the cost figures agreed upon
by the plaintiff and the defendant at the weekly meetings and
in the approval of the cost detail included in prior requests
for payment.
16.

On May 13, 1985, the plaintiff also submitted an

additional request for payment, presented by the plaintiff's
controller Richard Lambert.

The request for payment submitted

by Mr. Lambert exceeded the amount of the billing submitted by
E.M. Whitmeyer.
17.

The defendant relied upon the statements of Mr.

Whitmeyer in the weekly meeting and representations of Mr.
Whitmeyer in the cost detail provided with requests for
payments prior to the final request.

In October 1984, the

defendant changed its position to its detriment in reliance
upon the representations of the plaintiff, through Mr. E.M.
Whitmeyer, by agreeing to go forward with the project and not
to invoke its remedy of immediately cancelling the contract to
prevent further cost overrun.
18.

If the plaintiff, through its sole agent for the

project E.M. Whitmeyer, had not assured the defendant that the
budget for the classroom phase of the project would be adhered
to and the budget would not be exceeded without prior
permission of the defendant, the defendant would not have
proceeded with the classroom phase of the project.
19.

The written agreement provides that work on the

-4-

gymnasium would be substantially completed by September 21,
1984/ and that work on the classroom and library phase would be
completed by November 30/ 1984. The written contract language
was absolute and unmodified in any way.

While no specific

liquidated damages were included for failure of the plaintiff
to meet the completion deadline set forth in the written
contract/ the defendant is entitled/ under the language of the
contract/ to all actual damages attributable to any delay in
completion of the work which was not approved by the architect
pursuant to an extension of time granted by a change order to
the contract/ in accordance with the conditions of the contract.
20.

Work on the project was not completed by the

plaintiff until May 13/ 1985.
21.

The defendant suffered direct damages in loss of

revenues and in extra utility costs of $19/012.00 as a result
of the failure of the plaintiff to complete the project on time.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The plaintiff is estopped from claiming any sum

greater than the amount of the Whitmeyer final request for
payment.

The plaintiff is estopped by the defendant's

justifiable reliance upon the plaintiff's representations that
the price of the total project would not exceed the amount
agreed to by the plaintiff and the defendant as specified on
the continuation sheets of the requests for payment submitted
by the plaintiff prior to the final request for payment.

-5-

B.

The plaintiff is entitled to $8,550.70 from the

defendant owing on the Whitmeyer final request for payment.
Because this amount was tendered by the defendant to the
plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action, and refused
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to no interest.
C.

The defendant is entitled to the sum of

$19,012.00 against the plaintiff on the defendant's
counterclaim for failure to complete the construction project
on time.
D.

The defendant is entitled to the sum of

$83,970.30 from the plaintiff on the defendant's counterclaim
for failure of the plaintiff to provide accounting information
prior to October 1, 1984 sufficient to avoid the cost overrun
on the gymnasium.
E.

The defendant is entitled to judgment against the

plaintiff in the amount of $94,431.60, plus interest and costs.
DATED:

January

, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Hon. John F. Wahlquist
1009N
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

7

day of January, 1988, I hereby certify

that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
to the following:

Kendall S. Peterson
Michael J. Wilkins
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah

84133

.bLj/kb»/v
1009N
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ADDENDUM 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
RULING ON MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

Case No.

860994630

Defendant.

I regret that I misplaced Volume 4 of the record.

I am

painfully aware that this negligent act of mine further delayed
the

proceedings.

inconvenience.

I also

recognize

It has now

been

that it has put counsel to

carefully

read,

including

the

briefs and motions.
HISTORY OF THE MATTER
The
school.

defendant

desired

to

update

and

add

to

high

It was desirable that the construction be completed as

quickly as possible.

The defendant

employed an architect.

architect did some preliminary sketches and estimates.
to

its

complete

anticipated

details,
that

construction.
is in evidence.
accurately

etc.,

he would

at

a

complete

later

date.

this work

The
during

The

He hoped
architect
the

early

The plaintiff and defendant signed a contract that
It was a "cost plus" contract, and could be more

described as providing for a five percent management

Page 2
Ruling on Motion for
New Trial
Case No. 860994630

supervision
contract

fee.

It did contain

provided

quotes".

The

that

these

contract

penalties/ etc.

set

"target budget

were
out

goals

completion

and

figures".
not

hard

dates,

but

"cost
without

Without the completed plans and specificationsf

the target dates can be accepted only as goals.
working

The

arrangements

can

be

accurately

The undisputed

described

in

local

construction terms as a "fast track construction contract":

that

is, one that starts immediately and proceeds while the plans and
specifications

are being

prepared.

The

"fast

track

contracts"

are not uncommon in this area, and on occasion, have the effect
of bringing on an early

completion

date.

They also frequently

have a desirable effect of permitting growth in design or changes
in the construction project.

When the dispute ends, long after

the dated goal and far beyond the targeted budget,
were broad.

disagreements

There were many sets of used or disgarded drawings.

Thousands of cost records exist.

The parties literally

wanted

the jury to perform a complete audit and evaluation of the wisdom
of each expenditure.
would

have

months.

taken

The endeavor they asked the jury to perform

trained

accountants

and

construction

experts

After the evidence was completed/ the judge searched for

a method of simplifying the issues for the jury.
It worked

out

that

the

parties 1

evidence

does

not

dispute more than a few items of sufficient magnitude to justify
discussing

them,

plusf

of

course, the parties1

general

dispute
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Ruling on Motion for
New Trial
Case No. 860994630

and the blaming of one another for the delays.

These issues were

presented to the jury in a special verdict form.
The most serious question wasf "Who is to blame for the
delays?"

There was no conflicting evidence as to whether any

monies claimed spent were in fact spent/ except as presented in
the interrogatory
construction
reasonable

work

forms.

There is no

done

standards.

was

The

performed

delay

the actual

accordance
complex.

with
Safety

The library eventually lost

A committee was formed that met

periodically

to

construction.

The jury placed the blame for the delays on the

high

school

superintendent.

and

review

that

in

issue was

inspectors insisted on many changes.
a complete glass wall/ etc.

issue

the

"costsf

etc."

architect/

not

and

on

the

re-design

the

construction

At least they did not find defendant had carried

his burden of proof on this issue.

After verdict/ the lawyers

disputed over what the court's findings of fact/ etc./ should
be.
court

A lengthy hearing was held.
in the

presence

of

All rulings were made in open

counsel.

Everyone

knew

what

the

findings of fact and conclusions of law were to say before they
were

finally

drafted.

Plaintiff's

counsel

prepared

and

circulated them/ but apparently failed to re-circulate them after
they were in fact signed.
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New Trial
Case No. 860994630

Plaintiff

began

maneuvers

payment of the judgment.

that

were

intended

to

force

Defense counsel eventually sent a check

for the amount of the judgment to the plaintiff's counsel.

This

was done in a way to invite the exercise of a complete release.
The defense counsel now wishes to be granted a new trial only on
the issues concerning his counterclaim.
grounds

that

the

judgment

which

was

Plaintiff objects on the

granted

in the

favor is actually less than plaintiffs had hoped for.

plaintiffs
Plaintiffs

contend that the release executed by plaintiff's counsel was done
so at the invitation

of defense

counsel and actually should be

viewed as a complete end to the matter.

The court agrees.

The

issues are so interwoven that it would be illogical to permit the
defendant to pick and choose from the accounting, etc. f and the
delay

in construction

events, issues only that he wishes to be

granted a new trial on.

These issues that he chooses to present

at a new trial are interwoven with the other issues, and cannot,
in an intelligent manner, be separated.
RULING
The motion

for

a partial

new

trial

is denied

for

the

following reasons:
1.

There was

no

material

error

in

the

trial.

The

verdict rendered by the jury is a plausible interpretation of the
evidence received.
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New Trial
Case No. 860994630

2.
sense,

be

The defendant's counterclaim cannot, in an evidence
separated

from

defendant's

contentions;

therefore, a

limited new trial cannot take place.
3.

The release in question was executed by plaintiff's

attorneys at the invitations of defense counsel.
general
permitted

terms,

a

complete

to set aside

this

release.
release.

Neither

It is, in its
side

The defendant

should

be

should

be

estopped to ask for a limited trial.
DATED this V*Jr) day of April, 1989.
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New Trial
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CERTIFTCATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ^ S

day of April, 1989, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motion for New
Trial was mailed to the following:
Michael J. Wilkins
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS
Attorney for Plaintiff
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edward J. McDonough
Attorney for Defendant
50 South Main Street
Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

A CARR, Secretary

ADDENDUM 6

Edward J. McDonough, 2177
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.

j1
]>
>
I
i
i

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Oral Argument Not
Requested)

ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

)
]i

Civil No. 94630

Defendant.

J

Defendant objects to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law served by the plaintiff on January 21, 1988,
on the grounds that the proposed findings are not accurately
based upon the evidence at the trial.

The defendant objects to

specific proposed findings of fact as follows:
Finding No. 2, because the evidence presented at
trial, and particularly the contract between the architect and
the owner, establish that the architect was not -defendant's
agent.M
Finding No. 4, because the evidence presented at

trial, and most specifically the written "Standard Form of
Agreement Between Owner And Contractor" did not refer to the
contract completion dates as mere "target dates" but rather, to
the contrary, set fixed dates for completion which became a
contractual obligation of the plaintiff; and because Finding
No. 4 misstates the language of the agreement with regard to
its liquidated damages provision.
Finding No. 5, because it is unsupported by the
evidence.
Finding No. 7, because there was no evidence presented
at trial which indicated that the defendant "consented to the
extension of performance time."
Finding No. 10, because it misstates the evidence with
regard to the contracts being unchanged and interrupted.

In

this regard, Finding No. 10 is contradictory of Finding No. 6.
Finding No. 11, because the evidence showed that a
guaranteed maximum cost was agreed to between the parties as a
result of the weekly meeting with commenced on October 1, 1984,
and which new guaranteed maximum cost was fixed at least by the
time of the February interim request for payment.
Finding No. 16, because the jury did not find that the
plaintiff was entitled to be paid the amounts listed in Finding
No. 16, only that those amounts had, heretofore, not been paid.
Finding No. 17, as contrary to the evidence.

-2-
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Finding No. 18, because it is not a finding of fact,
but rather is a misplaced conclusion of law, and is erroneous
as a conclusion of law because it misstates the nature and
effect of the jury interrogatories.
Finding No. 19, because the evidence showed that the
"Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner And Contractor" did
not provide for interest on "any unpaid amounts" but rather on
amounts to become due and owing under that document, and
because the contract provided that no amounts became due and
owing under the contract from the owner until a request for
payment of the amount from the contractor was certified by the
architect.
Finding No. 20, because, while it correctly states the
Court's finding that interest would run at their legal rates
for judgment, it misstates the amount due.
Finding No. 21, as contrary to the evidence.
Finding No. 22, because it misstates the daily amount
of interest.
Finding No. 24, because it is contrary to the evidence.
The defendant objects to Conclusions of Law Nos. 1, 2,
3 and 4, as not being based upon proper findings of fact which
were based upon the evidence at the trial.
The defendant submits its objections on the argument
presented with regard to defendant's objections to the original

-3-
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proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by
the plaintiff, and the defendant does not request oral argument
on these objections.
DATED:

January

M> , 1988.

Edward J. McDonough l
50 South Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorney for Defendant
1069N

-4-
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, , ^CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

th day of January, 1988, I hereby certify

that I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Oral Argument Not
Requested) to the following:

Kendall S. Peterson
Michael J. Wilkins
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah

1069N

-5-
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ADDENDUM 7

Michael J. Wilkins, #3470
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5775
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

)
)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

vs.

)

ST, JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,
Defendants.

)
)

CIVIL NO. 94630

)

Judge Wahlguist

After trial to the Court with an advisory jury, and upon
receipt by the court of the findings of the jury with respect to
those matters submitted to it by special interrogatories, the
Court

makes

and

enters

the

following

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
16,

1984

The parties entered into a written agreement on July
by

which

plaintiff

agreed

to

supply

construction

services and materials at the St. Joseph High School in Ogden,
Utah.
2.

The contract language was drafted by defendant's agent.

3.

Defendant

agreed

to pay plaintiff

the

construction

costs allowed in the contract plus a 5% supervision fee.
1

4.

Although the contract between the parties designates

dates for substantial completion of September 21, 1984 for work
on the gym and November 30, 1984 for work on the classroom and
library, these dates were target dates and no specific penalty
was to be attached to the failure of the plaintiff to meet these
dates.
5.

During the course of performance it became apparent

that the cost of the building as designed by the architect would
greatly exceed the amount he had estimated.
6.

In order to reduce costs, the scope of the project, the

design and the management of costs were modified.

The changes

resulted

and

in

redrawing

construction

documents

weekly

management meetings to incrementally review costs.
7.

These changes effectively modified the terms of the

contracted agreement between the parties with respect to time of
performance.
extension

All

parties

were

aware

and

consented

of performance time beyond estimated

to the

schedules for

completion contained in the contract.
8.

The modification of the time terms of the contract did

not effect the "cost-plus11 nature of the contract.
9.

Although the contract between the parties designates

budgetary target prices of $48,239 for the gym work and $299,953
for the classroom/library

work, these amounts were estimates

only, and were not binding upon plaintiff.
10.

The

nature

of

the

contract

from

beginning

to end

remained unchanged and uninterrupted as a "cost-plus" or cost and
2

material contract.
11.

No

guaranteed

maximum

cost

was

agreed

between the

parties at the time the contract was executed or thereafter.
12.

All

of

the

work

expected

of

plaintiff

under

the

contract was completed prior to May 13, 1985.
13.

The work of plaintiff was accepted by defendant on May

13, 1985, and occupied and used from that date forward.
14.

The work of plaintiff fully met the requirements of the

contract, and defendant at no time raised objections to plaintiff
that the work was deficient in any way.
15.

Plaintiff

made

demand

on

May

13,

1985,

for

final

payment of amounts owed it under the contract.
16.

As of May 13, 1985, plaintiff was entitled to be paid

the remaining unpaid costs it had expended on the project, plus
5% as its fee.
a.

This amount included:
$8,550.70,

for

the

amount

withheld

from

the

billing submitted by E.M. Whitmeyer dated 13 May, 1985; and
b.

$2,046.30

for

payments

made

by

plaintiff

for

building permits on the project which were not included in
the Whitmeyer billing; and
c.

$3,855.00 for labor overhead paid by plaintiff on

the project and not included in the Whitmeyer building; and
d.

$5,182.71

for

miscellaneous

costs

paid

by

plaintiff on the project and not included in the Whitmeyer
building.
17.

The total amount to which plaintiff was entitled as of
3

May 13, 1985 was $19,634.71.
18.

As a matter of law, plaintiff is entitled to interest

on unpaid funds as determined by the special jury verdicts.
19.

The contract between the parties provides for interest

on any unpaid amounts to accrue at 1.25% per month.
20.

The

Court

found

that

interest

should

accrue

on

$19,634.71 at the legal rate for judgments from May 13, 1985
until the time judgment is entered.
21.

As of January 21, 1988, the total amount of principle

and interest owed plaintiff under the contract is $25,984.89.
22.

From January 21, 1988, until the date of judgment,

interest shall continue to accrue at the rate of 12% per annum
or $6.46 per day until paid in full.
23.

The plaintiff did not unreasonably delay completion of

the project.
24.

The defendant was not damaged by any act or failure to

act required of the plaintiff by the contract.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff committed no material breach of the contract

between the parties.
2.

Defendant

is

not

entitled

to

any

recovery

against

plaintiff on its Counterclaims.
3.

Defendant breached its obligations under the contract

by failing to pay to plaintiff the amounts owed, when due.
4.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant
4
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as of January 21, 1988, in the amount of $25,984.89 plus interest
at 12% per annum or $6.46 per day until the judgment is paid in
full.

, /

.
Dated this

/ day of

'/Z^S

, 19& J .

V.

, > BY THE COURT:

1490P.33

//
'I
,
7 John, F. Wahlquist /,
/
District Judge
;/

5
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Michael J. Wilkins, #3470
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5775

•;

J

\ v^'.TJ
'/&/

;.'C',v

sue

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,
Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 94630
Judge Wahlquist

The Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact
and its Conclusions of Law, hereby grants judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $19,634.71,
plus interest thereon accruing at the legal rate for judgments of
12%

per annum.

From May 13, 1985, until January 21, 1988,

accrued interest amounted to $6,350.18.

Interest shall continue

to accrue at 12% per annum or $6.46 per day until the judgment is
fully paid.

Further, plaintiff is entitled to an award of its

820

Recorded BoolJjJS
Page .. .1.0.6 £l
Indexed

costs incurred in litigation.

The total amount of judgm

January 13, 1988, is $25,984.89 plus costs o
DATED this

/

day of

/

'/>•

~, 198

BY Tip: COURT:

John F. Wahlquist/
D i s t r i c t Judge
1490P.32
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ADDENDUM 8

Michael J. Wilkins, #3470
Kendall S. Peterson, #4389
LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 355-5775

w

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NOTICE OF ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CIVIL NO. 94630

ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH-SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,
Defendants.
Plaintiff

Jacobsen,

Morrin

and Robbins, by

and

through

counsel of record hereby certifies that notice of the signing and
entry

of

judgment

against

St.

Joseph's

Board

of

Financial

Trustees was given on March 7, 1988 by placing a copy of the
signed judgment in the mail postage prepaid, addressed to Edward
j. McDonough, Berman & O'Rorke, 50 south Main Street, Suite 1250,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, this *~t>_ day of March, 1987.

LARSEN & WILKINS
1490P.62

1

ADDENDUM 9

Edward J. McDonough, 2177
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL
BOARD OB FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

)i
)>

RULE 60 MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

]

]
])

Civil No. 94630

Defendant.

The defendant moves this Court for its Order setting
aside the judgment entered on February 1, 1988, on the grounds
that the judgment was entered by mistake or in error, resulting
in prejudicial surprise to the defendant, was entered without
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the rules of this Court,
thereby preventing the defendant from moving for a new trial
under Rule 59, that the failure of the plaintiff to notify the
defendant of the entry of a judgment in time to move for a new
trial or appeal constitutes misrepresentation and misconduct on

the part of counsel for the plaintiff, and was entered in
violation of Rule 52 and Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Judgment was entered in violation of Rule 52 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it was entered without
findings of fact and conclusions of law being first made by the
court.

Rule 52(a) requires that:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58A . . ."
The defendant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by the plaintiff, and submitted an
alternate set of findings and conclusions.

This Court has not

ruled upon the defendant's objections to the plaintiffs
proposed findings, and no findings have been entered.
The plaintiff has executed upon the judgment entered
on February 1, and has garnished the defendant's bank accounts.
The plaintiff now seeks to add costs to the judgment
which was entered on February 1 without judgment for costs.
Instead of reopening the judgment and modifying the judgment to
add costs for the plaintiff, justice requires in this case that
the court set aside the judgment entered on February 1
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entirely, make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, tax the costs
pursuant to the defendant's motion that costs be taxed, and
then enter a judgment with notice to the defendant of the entry
of the judgment so that the defendant can move for a new trial
or appeal.
DATED:

March

>^

, 1988.

EdWrd J., M&DonougK
50 South/Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant
1175N

-3-

890

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this ffl day of March, 1988, I hereby certify that
I jcoucod fee be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing RULE 60 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT to the
following:
Kendall S. Peterson
• MichQei—JT- Wilkins LARSEN & WILKINS
10 East South Temple
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

1175N

'
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ADDENDUM 1 0

Edward J. McDonough, 2177
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 328-2200
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN, MORRIN AND ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

]

Plaintiff,

]i

>

i>

v.
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL
BOARD OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,

l
]
]I

ORDER GRANTING RULE 60
RELIEF, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 37 MOTION, AND
TAXING COSTS.
Civil No. 94630

Defendant.

This matter having come on for hearing on March 23,
1988# on defendant's Motion To Have Costs Taxed By The Court,
filed February 12, 1988, the plaintiffs "objection to
defendant's Motion To Have Costs Taxed By The Court", filed
March 8, 1988, and the Order obtained by the plaintiff that the
defendant's president, Allen Lipman, appear in supplemental
proceedings, and the defendant having made its Motion in open
Court pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
for relief from the judgment, and the Court having heard
argument on that Motion as well as on the pending Rule 37

895

Motion of the plaintiff and the pending objection by the
defendant to the plaintiffs second proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and the Court having heard argument of
counsel, it is hereby,
ORDERED that the defendants Rule 60 Motion For Relief
From The Judgment is granted to this extent, that judgment for
the plaintiff is hereby entered, de novo, as of and under the
date of March 23, 1988, which date shall be the date of
judgment for the purposes of all post-trial motions and notice
of appeal; that the plaintiff is awarded costs in this action
as set forth in the plaintiff's "Verified Memorandum of Costs"
dated February 2, 1988, with the exception that the plaintiff
is not allowed costs for photocopy charges or deposition
transcripts; that the examination of the defendant's president,
Allen Lipman, in a supplemental proceeding is continued until
April 13, 1988 at 9:30 a.m.; that the second set of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared and submitted by the
plaintiff are adopted by the Court, and that the plaintiffs
Rule 37 Motion is denied.

.*£ o

DATED thisj^^ / day of March, 1988.
COURT:

. John F. Wafllquist
District Judge
1178N
-2-
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ADDENDUM 1 1

LAW o r r i c e a

B E R M A N 5. O'RORKE
OAHICL L. SCRMAN
PATRICIA A. O'RORKE
OOUGLAS J . • • A * * *
SAMUEL O OAUDN
*CGOY A. TOM3IC
BLAKE S ATKIN
JESSE C THCNTAOUC

A PKOrCSStOMAl COM^OMATION
SUITC 1290

COWAftO J . MCOONOUOM
« r COUMSCL

3 0 SOUTH MAIM ST«CCT

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
TKlSPMOMC ( M O

QAI++

MfCMO

TTLXCO«*<C* « • « • 131 • • —

March 23, 1988

Allen Lipman, President
Amalgamated Sugar
P.O. Box 1520
Ogden, Utah 84402
Re:

Jacobsen, Morrin, Robbins v.
St. Joseph's High School

Dear Allen:
I have enclosed with this letter a copy of an Order
which I have prepared for Judge Wahlquist's signature,
encompassing his ruling at Court this morning, along with
copies of the Motion for Continuance and Order. Judge
Wahlquist continued the Order in Supplemental Proceedings which
was served upon you for three weeks, until April 13, 1988. It
wasn't until I stopped by your office and talked to your
secretary after court that I found out that you were going to
be in New York on April 13th. I shall ask Judge Wahlquist to
continue the supplemental proceedings again for one week until
April 20th, if that date is all right with you.
I made my complaints in court this morning about the
plaintiff's having the judgment entered without notifying us,
and then a month later proceeding to tie up the corporate bank
accounts. I made a "Rule 60" motion for relief from the
judgment that was entered on February 2nd. Judge Wahlquist
said that it was apparent to him that whoever lost at trial
would want to appeal, and so there was a real prejudice in the
plaintiff not notifying us of the entry of judgment, and so
judgment would be re-entered as of today so that we could file
a motion for new trial and/or appeal.

Allen Lipman, President
March 23, 1988
Page 2

^ ^

M&)
Very t r u l y ycrurs,

Edward J , McDonafugh
EJM:ct
1179N

